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Plotinus on the Objects of Thought
One of the features by which Neoplatonism diverges from the doctrines
of Plato as they are generally understood nowadays is in the Neoplatonic
account of intellect and its relation to the ideas. The received view is that
according to Plato the ideas, even if knowable by the intellect and in fact the
proper objects of thought, exist independently of any mind, whether human
or divine, that may contemplate them. The Neoplatonists, on the other hand,
all believed that the realm of ideas is to be identified with a realm of a divine
intellect, which hence not merely thinks about the ideas, but in some sense is
the ideas. Plotinus who appears to be die first to maintain a strong form of
this doctrine, claims that the intellect and the ideas are not even two distinct
parts or aspects of a thing unified into one (as one might say that the hard
disc and the screen of a computer are one); they are one in some much
stronger sense so that each idea in all of its parts is intellect and intellect is
throughout an idea; thus, intellect without ideas is an impossiblity and
likewise ideas without intellect. All this is likely to sound rather peculiar to
modem ears. However, I believe that given certain assumptions that
Platonists are apt to make, there are philosophically compelling reasons for
such a doctrine. It is quite compatible with the spirit of Platonism, if
perhaps not with the letter of Plato's dialogues.
In this paper I shall attempt to explain and defend this last claim,
focusing on Plotinus. Here is my main hypothesis, which I shall refine and
expand in the course of my paper: the strong identity Plotinus maintains
between the intellect and its objects, the ideas, can be explained in terms of
his acceptance of certain sceptical arguments; in particular he holds that
unless the subject and the object of thought are strictly identical, there is
room for doubt and error. Moreover, I suppose that Plotinus believed that
without this identity the traditional account of the forms as at once
ontological and epistemological standards cannot hold. Thus, I am suggesting
that we see Plotinus' position here as that of a Platonist who says to his
fellow Platonists: if you wish to hold, as you seem to do, that among first
principles are included both a universal intellect and the ideas, and that the
ideas are to serve as the ultimate standards not only of created things but also
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was to some extent following a tradition, as regards this view he did not hold
it just because any sane Platonist would hold it. Moreover, even if he took
over the doctrine of the intemality of the ideas from his predecessors,
Plotinus' version of it is quite distinct and goes beyond anything we can find
in those predecessors. This is generally acknowledged. Arthur Hilary
Armstrong has suggested in an influential article that Plotinus' particular
form of the doctrine arose from a certain reading of Alexander of
Aphrodisias* identification of the divine mind in Metaphysics ΧΠ 9 with the
active intellect of De anima ΙΠ 5: when the divine mind thinks the ideas it
thinks itself.3 It seems to me that this hypothesis about Peripatetic influence
on Plotinus is indeed incontestable.
But if we have a plausible account of why Plotinus came to hold the
very strong version of the intemality doctrine, why bother about looking
elsewhere? What role is there really for skeptical considerations to play?
Well, in the most pointed argument Plotinus ever gives for the intemality
thesis such considerations do clearly play a role. So any full explication of
Plotinus' views on this subject has to take that into account This has in fact
been clearly shown by Richard Wallis, to whose pioneering discussion I am
much indebted.45What I hope to achieve in this paper is to address the issues
from a more philosophical point of view. My understanding of Plotinus'
text also differs from Wallis's in some significant ways. But let me state
right now that there is no conflict between my hypothesis and accepting the
influence of Aristotelian noetics. My hypothesis is primarily concerned with
Plotinus' philosophical motivation for holding the strong intemality thesis,
the claim of noetic influence has more to do with his conception of it.

2. Ennead V. 5.(32) 1-2 and V. 3.(49) 1-5
In the first two chapters of Ennead V. 5. (32) to which Porphyry gave
the title "That the intelligibles are not outside the intellect and on the good"3,
Plotinus argues that the intelligibles are internal to the universal intellect.
3See Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima, p. 89,22-3 and Mantissa 112,18-13,2 (Bruns).
4”Skepticism and Neoplatonism" in W. Haase (ed.), ANRW Π. 36. 2, p. 911-54.
5This treatise is part of the "Grossschrift" consisting of III. 8, V, V. 5 and I I 9, which were
made individual treatises by Porphyry. V. 5 is in content especially close to V. 5, which
precedes it
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and I have shown elsewhere why it is not tenable.6 It is more likely that his
opponents are either Aristotelians or Stoics, or Platonists influenced by
either one of these schools. They are people who believe that the intellect
has demonstrative knowledge while admitting that the first principles of the
demonstrations are immediately known. It seems to me that Aristotelians or
Aristotelizing Platonists are the most likely candidates.7
But what is the structure of Plotinus' argument here? In particular how
is what he says about self-evidence in the intellect related to what he goes on
to say about perception? And what precisely are Plotinus' points about
perception? As to the former question, I think the point is that the
trustworthiness of those intellectual truths that are admitted to be self-evident
cannot be founded on sense-perception, a doctrine Plotinus may take to be
advocated by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics 19. This is so firstly
because even in the case of the clearest sense-experiences, when unaided by
reason and intellect, we can ask whether their objects exist only in our
affections. Secondly, even granting that what is to be grasped in senseperception is in external sensible objects, nevertheless, what is known
through sense-perception is only an image of the thing, which itself remains
external. Some light is thrown on what Plotinus means by this last point at
the beginning of chapter 2, where he summarizes the main points of chapter
1. It becomes clear there that what he means by "image" (eidplon), which
sense-perception is supposed to grasp, is the quality of each thing as opposed
to its essence or quiddity. Thus, contrary to what one might suppose from
these lines in chapter 1 taken in isolation, Plotinus is not saying that the
senses grasp only what they have taken on as opposed to what exists in the
object independently of being perceived. I shall return to this point in a little
while. But supposing that what I just said is right, we can fit the point with
what I said before about criticism of Aristotelian views: if perception knows
only how things are qualified, but not their essences, intellect cannot obtain
its clearness concerning what it immediately knows from sense-perception.
For what the intellect knows immediately, also on the Aristotelian theory, is

6See E. K. Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge,
1988), pp.
7Cf. Anal. pr. 64b35; Anal. post. 76b23; Top. lOObl; Phys. 193a5.
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its images, not of the object as it is in itself for it can have no direct contact
with it.
In chapter 1 Plotinus also says that if the objects of intellect are external
to it, the intellect would not recognize justice and beauty, for instance, for
the principles of judgement for justice and beauty would be outside the
intellect (lines 29-33). I take it that in his view the principles of judgement
for justice and beauty are the ideas of justice and beauty themselves. A little
later (lines 47-51) he says that if the objects of intellection are outside the
intellect, the intellect would at most grasp something analogous to images in
gold made by some sculptor or engraver, and intellect's awareness of would
be like sense-perception: a grasp of mere images while the real thing
(corresponding to the idea in the craftsman's mind), would escape it. And if
the intellect grasped such images of the real thing, he asks, why should one
thing that the intellect grasps be justice and another beauty?
Why should the intellect have a difficulty recognizing justice and beauty
if it grasped images of them? The point of these passages—a point Plotinus
himself explicitly makes—is that unless the ideas are really internal to the
intellect they (and thereby everything else) will be unknowable. The
ultimate standards of truth for a Platonist is of course the ideas; if they
themselves are outside the divine mind and the divine mind has only images
of them, its knowledge will be second hand; the image of justice that the
divine mind had access to, would be something that may have the quality of
being just, but it would not be justice itself, but a mere tvnos of it. And in
order to know the image for what it is, i. e. the image of justice, the divine
mind would have to refer to the idea itself; the image would be only the idea
expressed in and through something other than itself. Hence, the intellect
would need a ground or justification, which it cannot in principle have, for
declaring the image of justice to be that image rather something else.
In chapter 2 Plotinus makes it very clear that the mind with all its
contents is evident to itself and that the real truth, which it contains, i.e. the
ideas, "does not agree with something else, but with itself, and there is
nothing in addition to it, but what it says that is what it is, and what it is is
what it says" (lines 18-20).10 I take the point of this to be the following:
ιοί do not see that it is necessary to alter the text here as Theiler does, followed by
Armstrong. My translation is based on the H-S text
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than the expressions or the expression parts in which they are referred to.
The idea is again that the ideas in the divine universal mind are not
expressions that express (mean, correspond to or signify) something other
than themselves. For on the level of thought expressions are just like mere
representations on the level of being.
How, then, does Plotinus think that the intelligibles are internal? What
is the mode of thinking in terms of the things themselves rather than any
representations of them? This is a large and complex issue that I cannot
address in its entirety here. But I shall make a few comments concerning
Plotinus' clearest presentation of it, the one he gives in V. 3.
In this treatise Plotinus discusses the question of self-knowledge. He
asks which faculties, if any, have self-knowledge. Sense-perception is ruled
out on the ground that it only knows what is external to itself. Discursive
reason, which in Plotinus' view is the faculty with which we identify our
empirical self, is rejected as well for basically the same reason: it is
concerned with representations that come to it from something else, i.e.
from sense-perception below, as he puts it, and from intellect above (chapter
3).12 However, he does seem to hold that discursive reason has selfknowledge of a sort: it knows, for instance, that it It is discursive reason, that
it gains understanding of the things outside if, and that it judges what it
judges. But this is not genuine self-knowledge, because discursive reason
knows these things discursively, i.e. by means of representations derived
from the pure intellect (chapter 4, 15-28). Thus, discursive reason is not
directly reflexive.
Intellect however is. In the next chapter Plotinus develops what is
perhaps the subtlest and philosophically most interesting of his many
accounts of the nature of intellect. The first point to be established is that
for intellect to have a more perfect kind of self-knowledge than discursive
reason it cannot be, as it were, two things unified into one thing so that it
knows itself in the sense that one part, the thinker-side, knows the other, the
object side of thought. In that case intellect as a whole would not know itself
completely, for the thinker-side would not know itself at all. Thus, we have
have a claim to the effect that even a subject-object distinction in the
12V. 3. 3-4; cf. IV. 3. 30 and I. 4. 9-10.
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Perhaps [intellect] will add the one who has contemplated from itself, in
order that it may have thought itself completely; but if the one who has
contemplated, then at the same time also that which has been seen. If
now that the contemplated belongs to the contemplation, if [these
contemplated objects] are impressions of them, it does not have them
themselves; on the other hand, if it has them themselves, it does not
have by seeing them as a result of dividing itself, but it both saw them
and had them prior to the division. If this is so, the contemplation must
be the same as the contemplated and the intellect the same as the
intelligible. (V. 3. 5, 17-23)
Unfortunately I am not confident that I follow the argument here step by
step, but it seems to me that considerations such as the following are at least
a part of what he saying: Suppose intellect is divided into a thinker side (or
subject) and object side. Suppose also that the subject includes itself as its
own object. Suppose in addition that intellect knows the original intelligibles
themselves rather than impressions or representaions of them. Then, in the
same act as it apprehends itself, it will also apprehend the objects of the
thought of the subject. Now, these objects as apprehended in that act
whereby the intellect apprehends itself are either impressions or originals.
If the subject as such does not contain the originals it could only see
impressions by directing itself toward itself, for there were no originals
there. But this cannot be so, for it is assumed (though not argued for yet
here) that intellect knows the originals. Hence, it cannot know them by
dividing itself into a subject side that does not contain them and an object
side which does. Hence, the subject must have seen and contained the
originals from the beginning. This is really a reductio argument against the
hypothesis that the intellect is divided into a subject side and an object side on
the assumption that intellect does in fact possess the real things themselves.
Then, Plotinus moves on to restate a point familiar from V. 5: intellect must
know the real things themselves, for else there can be no truth: "for tmth
ought not to be of something else, but what it says, that it should also be."
To summarize: if intellect is to know the things themselves and itself, the
subject-object distinction must be abolished; but intellect does know the
things themselves; hence, intellect is not divided into a subject side and an
object side.
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and the inner act of F, which we mentioned before, all turn out to be the
very same thing: pure F-thoughts.

3 , The conclusions so far seen from a wider perspective
In Plato's dialogues the ideas are supposed to be causes of sensible
things, which have the character they do in virtue of participating in the
ideas or imitating them. The ideas are perfectly that which they cause in
other things; or otherwise stated they are necessarily and essentially that
which other things are only contingently and superficially. Thus, we may
say that the ideas are perfect standards of what else there is. But the ideas
are not only standards of what is, they are also standards of knowledge.
They are according to Plato the only objects of knowledge and, moreover,
they are supposed to be such that once we have made acquaintance with
them, there is no room for error or doubt with respect to them: they
somehow bear their true identity on their surface so that in their case
appearence and reality collapse into one another. Plato clearly thought that
any kind of skepticism with respect to the knowledge of the ideas is
precluded: in their case there is no veil of appearence between them and the
knowing subject. By postulating entities such as the ideas in which the
standards of being and the standards of knowledge coincide, Plato thought
that he could avoid the perils of relativism and scepticism widespread in his
own times. That is exactly what Chemiss has called "the philosophical
economy of the theory of forms".17
I suggest that we see Plotinus as being in perfect agreement with the
Platonic program. Moreover, he shares with Plato all the essential views
about the nature of the ideas: they are necessarily what they are; and they
are standards and causes of whatever else there may be; furthermore, they
are standards of knowledge: we refer to the forms or rely on our knowledge
of them when passing judgements on sensible things18 and they themselves
are self-authenticating to the mind thinking them. Plotinus only insists that if
17H. Chemiss, "The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of Ideas", American Journal o f
Philology LVn (1936), 445-56).
18For a detailed recent discussion of this see H. Blumenthal, "Plotinus and Proclus on the
Criterion of Truth" in P. Huby and G Neal (eds.). The Criterion o f Truth (Liverpool, 1989),
pp. 257-80.
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that is what it is, and what it is is what it says". In this doctrine we see the
notion that the standard or criterion of F must ut once be that very thing of
which it is the standard or criterion, namely F, and in being F it must
somehow "say" that it is F. The intellect's thought about F is not true
because it corresponds to F itself; it is F itself and being F itself and at the
same time a thought it is the knowledge and announcement of F. This does
at first sight appear very mysterious. However, Plotinus idea behind this
claim is readily understandable. Perhaps the best way to expound it is
through analogous cases from later philosophy.
Wilfred Sellars launched an attack on what he called "The Myth of the
Given".21 In particular he has traced in the tradition of empiricism a notion,
mostly implicit rather than explicit, of items which are at once supposed to
be items of a certain kind and instances of knowledge of that kind. That is to
say in the empirical tradition a given sensation (sense datum, impression,
sensum, phenomenal quality) is supposed to be both something green and an
instance of awareness or knowledge of something green. Such items may
seem to provide a solid foundation of knowledge and meaning, for they
bridge the gap between what is and what is within the reach of our minds:
the very same thing is an F and is our direct awareness of F. Now, Sellars’s
attack on the Myth of the Given, consists in undermining the coherence of
this very notion or at least of the claim that sensations are plausible
candidates for something which at once is and is knowledge of itself such as
it is. However, he seems to agree that if there is a given it must be such as
he describes it, namely a thing which is both of a certain kind and knowledge
of something of that kind. In other words, if there is a given, it must be just
as Plotinus says the intelligibles must be: it is "knowledge of itself such as it
is" or "that which it is is what it says". I believe that Sellars is quite right in
his analysis of empiricism and I believe that he is also right in his contentions
about what the given must be like, if there is such a thing. Moreover, it is
fairly clear that what Plotinus is after in his account of the identity of the
intelligibles and the intellect is a notion of a given. Furthermore, it must be
said in his praise that he shows a deep understanding of what it takes for
there to be a given, and as opposed the empiricists’ view, his account of it
21See especially Science, Perception and Reality (London and New York, 1963), pp. 69-70,
129-34 and 156-61.
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have to be such that from it one could read off all the correct applications of
the expression expressing a given meaning. It seems to me that any feature
that is to accomplish this must have the characteristics of Plotinus attributes
to the intelligibles.
In surveying candidates for determinants of meaning Kripke briefly
mentions Platonism in connection with Frege’s views. Frege's Platonism is
of course the sort of Platonism according to which mathematical objects exist
as Platonic "ideas" independently of any mind. Expressions have a certain
"sense" associated with them that is likewise an objective non-mental thing.
This sense determines the reference of a sign, which in the case of
mathematics is a "Platonic" objective mathematical entitiy, e.g. a the plus
function. But for people to grasp the sense associated with a sign, they must
have appropriate ideas in their minds associated with the sign. According to
Kripke it is in relation to the alleged function of these mental ideas that
Wittgensteins skeptical problem about meaning sneaks in for a Platonist of
the Fregean sort:
[The skeptical problem] arises precisely in the question how the
existence in my mind of any mental entity or idea can constitute
"grasping" any particular sense rather than another. . . . For
Wittgenstein, Platonism is largely an unhelpful evasion of the problem
of how our finite minds can give rules that are supposed to apply to an
infinity of cases. Platonic objects may be self-interpreting, or rather,
they may need no interpretation; but ultimately there must be some
mental entity involved that rasises the sceptical problem.23
Suppose one is willing to go along with Platonism in holding that Platonic
objects in themselves are self-explanatory (or need not interpretation), while
insisting that what anybody, including God, can have access to is at best
certain mental representations of them, which however fail to give us the
real things themselves. The obvious move would be to maintain that the
ideas are in fact internal to the mind. This is of course just what Plotinus
does. Objectivity and unversality are preserved because the mind in question
is a universal and divine one.
23S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Mass. 1982), p.
54.
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representations and hence not the sort of thinking the universal intellect is
constantly and eternally engaged in, nevertheless we can momentarily rise to
that sort of thinking ourselves, which for Plotinus means that we can become
the universal intellect. In this context it is worth pointing out in addition that
Plotinus is not so much concerned with answering skeptical arguments
directly. I suspect that rather he the kind of philosopher who believes that
skepticism leads to absurd consequences. Nevertheless, he would grant that
skepticism shows that no commonsensical account of the foundation of
knowledge will do. So his message to other dogmatic philosophers is that
unless they are willing to go along with him and posit a universal intellect
with the features he claims for it, there is can be no secure foundation for
knowledge.
It may be natural for us to see what Plotinus is doing as a correction of
Plato: he may sound like someone saying that Plato was essentially right but
he failed to see that the ideas must be internal to the divine mind and that the
doctrine must be set straight in this regard. However, this is almost certainly
not how Plotinus saw the matter himself. He certainly must have thought
that what he is claiming was also Plato's view and that this could be seen if
one studied him carefully and intelligently. I shall not attempt to detect the
train of argument in Plotinus' Plato exegesis, still less undertake a defense of
it. However, two remarks are in order. First of all the main source for a
divine mind in Plato is of course the demiurge in the Timaeus; moreover,
the demiurge is said to gaze at the ideas, which may suggest that they are
something external to him. However, it is clear that on any account the story
of the demiurge cannot be interpreted as the literal truth, for instance, being
a mind, h does not really gaze as if with eyes. Hence, Plotinus would say
the matte is not at all settled against internal forms on the basis of the
Timaeus. Secondly, it may be claimed that Plato explicitly denies that the
ideas are mental items of any sort in Parmenides 132 B-D. However, there
may be ways to avoid attributing this conclusion to Plato himself. For
instance, Plotinus may have thought as Proclus surely did that the first part
of the Parmenides raises a number of difficulties concerning the theory of
ideas, all of which are to be solved. He may have thought, in my view quite
plausibly, that the apparent refutations there do not present Plato's final
judgement.

